Abstract. BitCoin transactions are malleable in a sense that given a transaction an adversary can easily construct an equivalent transaction which has a different hash. This can pose a serious problem in some BitCoin distributed contracts in which changing a transaction's hash may result in the protocol disruption and a financial loss. The problem mostly concerns protocols, which use a "refund" transaction to withdraw a deposit in a case of the protocol interruption. In this short note, we show a general technique for creating malleability-resilient "refund" transactions, which does not require any modification of the BitCoin protocol. Applying our technique to our previous paper "Fair Two-Party Computations via the BitCoin Deposits" (Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2013) allows to achieve fairness in any Two-Party Computation using the BitCoin protocol in its current version.
Malleability of BitCoin transactions
We assume that the reader is familiar with the BitCoin protocol and in particular with non-standard transaction scripts (used e.g. in so-called distributed contracts). For general description of BitCoin, see e.g. [4, 1] or BitCoin wiki page http://en.bitcoin.it/. For the description of non-standard transaction scripts, see [2, 1] or Contracts page http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts.
BitCoin transactions are malleable 1 in a sense that given a transaction T it is easy to create a functionally identical transaction T ′ (T and T ′ differs only in the input scripts) which has a different hash 2 . This gives an adversary an opportunity to slightly change the transaction sent by a user before it is included in the blockchain. It strongly affects the distributed contracts which use the hashes of the transactions before broadcasting them.
The source of the malleability is the fact that in the current version of the BitCoin protocol, each transaction contains a hash of the whole transaction it spends, while the signatures are taken over the simplified version of the transaction (excluding the input scripts).
The most common scenario in which the malleability of transactions is a problem is the following. Suppose that there is a transaction Deposit , which should be redeemed by a transaction Fuse 3 with time-lock t, but for some reason Fuse has to be created and signed before Deposit is broadcast. 4 . In the above scenario a problem arises if the Deposit transaction is maliciously changed and its version included in the blockchain has a different hash than expected, what invalidates the transaction Fuse.
In our recent paper [1] we proposed a modification of BitCoin which eliminates the malleability problem. The idea of this modification was to identify the transactions by the hashes of their simplified versions (excluding the input scripts). With this modification one can of course still modify the input script of the transaction, but the modified transaction would have the same hash. We used this improvement of BitCoin to guarantee the correctness of the Fuse transactions, which had to be sign before broadcasting its input transaction. In this short note we present another approach to achieving the correctness of Fuse transactions which does not need any modification of the BitCoin protocol.
New technique
Our technique uses a BitCoin-based timed commitment scheme introduced in [2] . We briefly describe this commitment scheme in Sec. 2.1. Later in Sec. 2.2 we show how to construct Fuse transactions, which are resistant to malleability and in Sec. 2.3 we apply it to SCS protocol from [1] , what leads to a general fair Two-Party Computation protocol, which is secure in the current version of the BitCoin protocol (in particular, even if transactions are malleable). In Sec. 2.4 we list other protocols, which can be made resistant to malleability using our technique.
BitCoin-based timed commitment scheme
Commit(in: T ) in-script: sig C ([Commit]) out-script(body, σ1, σ2, x): (verC (body, σ1) ∧ H(x) = h) ∨ (verC (body, σ1) ∧ verR(body, σ2)) val: d B Open(in: Commit) in-script: sig C ([Open]), ⊥, s out-script(body, σ): verC (body, σ) val: d B Fuse(in: Commit) in-script: sig C ([Fuse]), sig R ([Fuse]), ⊥ out-script(body, σ): verR(body, σ) val: d B tlock: t d B d B d B d B d B
Pre-conditions:
1. The protocol is executed between the Committer C holding the key pair C and the Recipient R holding the key pair R. 2. The Committer knows the secret string s. 3. The blockchain contains an unredeemed transaction T with value d B, which can be redeemed with the key C.
The CS.Commit(C, R, d, t, s) phase:
1. The Committer computes h = H(s) and broadcasts the transaction Commit. This obviously means that he reveals h, as it is a part of the transaction Commit. 2. The Committer waits until the transaction Commit is confirmed. Then, he creates the body of the transactions Fuse, signs it and sends the signature to the Recipient. 3. If the Recipient does not receive the signature or the signature is incorrect, then he quits the protocol. In this section we briefly describe a timed commitment scheme from [2] , which will be denoted CS. The protocol CS is executed between the Committer (denoted C) and the Recipient (denoted R). During the commitment phase the Committer commits himself to some string s by revealing its hash h = H(s). Moreover the parties agree on a moment of time t until which the Committer should open the commitment, i.e. reveal the secret value s. The protocol is constructed in such a way that if the Committer does not open the commitment until time t, then the agreed amount of d B is transfered from the Committer to the Recipient. More precisely, at the beginning of the protocol the Committer makes a deposit of d B, which is returned to him if he opens the commitment before time t or taken by the Recipient otherwise.
We follow the notation from [2, 1] in which the transactions are represented as boxes. The graph of transactions and the full description of the CS protocol is presented on Fig. 1 . Refer to [2] for more details. Notice that even if the transaction Commit is maliciously changed before being included in the block, the protocol still succeeds because the transaction Fuse is created after Commit is included in the blockchain, so it always contains the correct hash of Commit . Therefore, the CS protocol is resistant to transaction malleability.
The execution of the commitment phase with C as the Committer and R as the Recipient will be denoted by CS.Commit (C, R, d, t, s) , where d is the size of the deposit and t is the time until which C should reveal the secret s.
Fuse transactions resistant to malleability
Suppose that in the execution of some protocol between the parties A and B there is a transaction Deposit , which should be redeemed to an address controlled by A at the time t if it is not spent earlier. 5 The typical solution would be to create a transaction Fuse with time-lock t, which is signed by both parties and redeems Deposit . Moreover, Deposit has to be claimable using signatures of both parties. The graph of transactions for this situation is presented on Fig. 2 . We will now present a technique for creating Fuse transactions, which are resistant to malleability. The general idea is to use a timed commitment instead of using a time-lock directly. More precisely, the transaction Deposit should be claimable with a signature of A and a random secret r, which is known only to B. It means that A can claim Deposit using the Fuse transaction as soon as the secret string r is revealed by B. In our situation we would like the secret to be revealed at the time t. It can be achieved by executing at the very beginning (before broadcasting the Deposit transaction) the CS.Commit(B, A, d, t, r) protocol. In this case at the time t either: the CS commitment was opened, the secret r is known and A can broadcast the Fuse transaction (assuming that Deposit was not spent earlier) or the CS commitment was not opened and A gets d B from the Fuse transaction in the CS execution. The graph of transactions is presented on Fig. 3 . The key difference, which makes a new construction resistant to malleability is that the Fuse transaction does not need to be signed by B, so it can be created and signed by A after the Deposit transaction is confirmed and its hash is known. A drawback of this construction is that the other party (B in our case) also has to make a deposit.
Fair Two-Party Computation protocol
The simultaneous BitCoin-based timed commitment scheme (SCS) described in [1] is an extended version of the CS protocol in which two parties simultaneously commit to their secret strings. The pivotal property of this protocol is that after the commitment phase either: both parties are committed or none of them is committed (the latter is only possible if one of the parties misbehaved). The graph of transactions is presented on Fig. 4 . Refer to [1] for more details.
The main application of the SCS protocol is the FairComputation protocol from [1] , which is a general fair TwoParty Computation protocol (refer to [1] for more details). However, in contrast to CS, the SCS protocol is vulnerable to transaction malleability, because it requires the Fuse transactions to be created and signed before broadcasting their input transaction. Therefore, in [1] it was assumed that the BitCoin protocol is modified in such a way, that the transactions are no longer malleable.
In this section we present a modified version of SCS protocol called NewSCS, which is resistant to transactions malleability and does not require any change of the BitCoin protocol. Combining it with the FairComputation protocol from [1] it gives the general fair Two-Party Computation protocol. The NewSCS protocol is a result of a straightforward application of the technique from Sec. 2.2 to the SCS protocol. The graph of the transactions and the full description of the NewSCS protocol are presented on Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 
Other applications
In this section we list some other protocols, which can be made resistant to malleability using our technique:
-http://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts, Example 1: Providing a deposit. Although, this protocol could be fixed using our technique, the resulting protocol would be rather impractical as it would require the server to also make a deposit. [3] . , but it is used in the output scripts to stress that the value of the hash is directly included in the transaction (instead of value of x and an application of the hash function).
